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Worker Centers: 
Labor Policy as a Carrot, not a Stick 
Kati L. Griffith and Leslie C. Gates* 
Worker centers empower communities of workers that are challenging for labor unions to 
organize. This includes immigrant workers and other vulnerable workers in high turnover 
jobs. These centers often organize workers that fall within the definition of “employee” 
under the Depression-era laws designed to protect some forms of collective worker activity 
from employer retaliation. Although employees associated with these centers can benefit 
from labor law’s carrot, worker centers are not “labor organizations” subject to labor law’s 
vast reporting requirements and restrictions on associational behavior (labor law’s stick). 
We use an original study of worker centers’ filings to the Internal Revenue Service to 
reveal that worker centers are more similar to nonprofits, than labor organizations. Both 
First Amendment and labor law principles affirm the characterization of worker centers as 
organizations that are not subject to labor law’s stick. Providing worker centers access to 
labor law’s carrot, but not its stick, is particularly compelling given that they are operating 
at a historical moment when income inequality parallels New Deal levels and hostility to 
worker organizations and workers’ rights is pervasive. Our carrot-but-not-a-stick ap-
proach has implications for the vitality of American labor policy. It opens up space for 
emerging worker centers to expand their efforts to amplify employee voice and improve the 
working lives of the growing low-wage workforce. 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  602  R 
I. THE DEBATE: ARE WORKER CENTERS LABOR 
ORGANIZATIONS “DEALING WITH” EMPLOYERS? . . . . . . . . . . . .  606  R 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH: WORKER CENTERS ARE NOT 
SET UP TO “DEAL WITH” EMPLOYERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  610  R 
A. Do Not Exhibit Purposes to “Deal With” Employers . . . . . . . . .  611  R 
B. Too Small to “Deal With” Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  612  R 
C. Too Reliant on External Funding to Deal With Employers . . 613 R 
III. LEGAL DOCTRINAL RATIONALES FOR INTERPRETING 
“DEALING WITH” TO EXCLUDE WORKER CENTERS . . . . . . . . .  614  R 
A. Constitutional Law Only Permits Labor Law’s Stick in 
Exchange for Collective Bargaining Privileges . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  614  R 
B. Labor Law’s Inequality of Bargaining Power Purpose Forbids 
Use of Labor Law’s Stick on Worker Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  616  R 
* Griffith is Associate Professor of Labor & Employment Law, Cornell ILR School & 
Associate Member of the Cornell Law Faculty. Gates is Associate Professor and Director of 
Graduate Studies at Binghamton University’s Department of Sociology. This work benefited 
from presentations at NYU School of Law, Cornell University and the Labor and Employ-
ment Relations Association and from conversations with Joseph Bazler, Austin Case, Samuel 
Estreicher, Matthew Ginsburg, Louis Hyman, Michael Iadevaia, Wilma Liebman and Julie 
Ulmet. We thank Nathan Pflaum for his superb research assistance, Christopher Ioannou for 
his extensive editing and Matthew Ginsburg and Ce´sar Rosado Marza´n for their careful feed-
back on a prior draft. We also appreciate Janice Fine for her continued generosity and insight 
and all of the individuals who helped put together the dataset on worker center funding, in-
cluding Carunya Achar, Joseph Bazler, Aliqae Geraci, Benjamin Hollander, Jonathan Kim, 
and Zane Mokhiber. All errors and omissions are our own. A special thanks goes out to 
Michael Svedman and the editors of the Harvard Law & Policy Review for providing com-
ments that deepened the contribution of this piece. 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\14-1\HLP106.txt unknown Seq: 2  4-NOV-19 13:46 
602 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 14 
IV. POLICY RATIONALES FOR INTERPRETING “DEALING WITH” 
TO EXCLUDE WORKER CENTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  621  R 
A. Worker Centers Organize the Marginalized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  622  R 
B. Inequality Parallels New Deal Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  623  R 
C. Hostile Environment for Workers’ Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  624  R 
V. WORKER CENTERS AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR POLICY . . .  625  R 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  627  R 
INTRODUCTION 
A novel worker organizational model called worker centers has helped 
to raise minimum wages at the state and local levels in the United States, 
despite persistent wage policy stagnation at the federal level.1 Worker centers 
have improved wages and working conditions for their participants through 
a combination of policy advocacy, collaborations with worker rights enforce-
ment agencies,2 service provision, and pressure on employers. Even though 
there are only approximately 226 centers nationwide,3 worker centers have 
stoked policy debates in Washington about whether U.S. labor law restric-
tions apply to these groups.4 
U.S. labor law provides employees with protections in some circum-
stances, and imposes restrictions on labor organizations in others. Through 
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the NLRA) labor law protects 
some forms of collective activity among statutorily-defined “employees” to 
improve their work lives from employer interference (labor law’s “carrot”).5 
Employers cannot reprimand someone for joining in various types of collec-
tive actions with their peers. They cannot impose seemingly neutral, but 
overly restrictive, policies that limit employees’ ability to communicate with 
one another.6 Employers cannot restrict employees, for instance, from dis-
1 Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 2, 7 (2016) (attributing wage in-
creases and other work benefits at the local and state levels to the efforts of alternative labor 
groups). See also Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Reimagining Labor Law: Beyond Unions, 
Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561, 562–65 (2014) (“The best hope for a 
revived labor movement appears to lie with new actors such as workers’ centers . . . that can 
work in partnerships with established unions; class action plaintiffs’ firms dedicated to enforc-
ing workplace rights; and government agencies and attorneys general.”); He´ctor Cordero-Guz-
ma´n, Worker Centers, Worker Center Networks, and the Promise of Protections for Low-Wage 
Workers, 18 JOURNAL OF LABOR & SOC’Y 31, 32–33 (2015) (identifying worker centers’ net-
work power).
2 See e.g., Janice Fine et al., Understanding Worker Center Trajectories, in NO  ONE  SIZE 
FITS  ALL: WORKER  ORGANIZATION, POLICY  AND  MOVEMENT  FOR A  NEW  ECONOMIC 
AGE (2018); Andrew Elmore, Collaborative Enforcement, 10 NORTHEASTERN UNIV. L. REV. 
72, 77–83 (2018); JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE 
EDGE OF THE DREAM 157–79 (2006).
3 See Fine et al., supra note 2, at 10. 
4 See infra Part I. 
5 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
6 Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796, 803 (1945) (describing employer’s “long 
standing” and general rule against distribution of literature, which was neutrally worded and 
adopted before union activity, as an interference with employees’ NLRA rights). 
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cussing their wages and working conditions with each other during non-
work time.7 
Along with providing rights to employees engaged in collective action, 
labor law, through the NLRA and its sister statute the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (the LMRDA), also imposes restrictions and 
obligations on statutorily-defined “labor organizations” (labor law’s “stick”). 
Specifically, the NLRA restricts organizations that exist for the purpose of 
“dealing with employers” from such activity as secondary boycotts. The 
LMRDA requires labor organizations to fulfill extensive reporting require-
ments about their finances and internal affairs.8 Powerful forces in Washing-
ton argue that worker centers are “labor organizations” and thus subject to 
labor law’s stick. 
A heated labor law controversy concerning worker centers is somewhat 
surprising given private sector labor law’s waning relevance. Indeed, it is now 
customary for labor scholars and commentators to disparage private sector 
labor policy, molded in the Depression era of the 1930s. They portray it as 
eviscerated by court decisions and out of touch with a modern economy in-
creasingly characterized by service and technology.9 In this vein, one scholar 
recently described contemporary private sector labor law as an “unrecogniz-
able nub,” compared to its revolutionary beginnings in 1935.10 
The controversy is also unexpected because worker centers tend to or-
ganize hard to reach, marginalized groups of workers. These groups include 
low-wage workers in high turnover industries that are largely passed over by 
labor unions, the central protagonists of labor law.11 In these industries, labor 
unions struggle to sustain long-term worker organizing efforts and to achieve 
their primary goal—contractual gains for workers through compulsory col-
lective bargaining. In addition, some worker center organizing has occurred 
among workers—such as aspiring fashion models and Amazon Mechanical 
Turk gig workers—that straddle the consequential legal line between em-
ployee status (labor policy beneficiary) and independent contractor status 
(beyond labor policy’s reach).12 
7 Id. at 801. 
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (2012). Labor scholars often treat the 
NLRA, the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA and the Landrum-Griffin Act “as a 
unified statutory scheme for collective labor relations.” See also Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a 
Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 213 (2015).
9 See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 1, at 7 (referring to some as rejecting “the project of labor 
law altogether, concluding that unionism in the contemporary political economy is hopeless”); 
Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2686 (2008); 
Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. 
L. REV. 125, 139–46 (2003).
10 Nicole Hallett, From the Picket Line to the Courtroom: A Labor Organizing Privilege to 
Protect Workers, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 475, 477 (2015) (“Supreme Court . . . 
has whittled away at the rights of workers until only an unrecognizable nub remains”).
11 See Fine et al., supra note 2, at 12. 
12 See Leon Neyfakh, Not Your Grandpa’s Labor Union, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 06, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/04/05/how-labor-advocacy-changing/QKULX 
uazXGHMW7EBBe6IKJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/6YWG-6RN9]; Kati L. Griffith, The 
FLSA at 80: Everything Old is New Again, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 133 (2019) (“The 
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Moreover, the push to apply labor law’s restrictions to worker centers is 
puzzling because worker centers, unlike traditional labor unions, very rarely 
turn to labor law to protect individuals that participate in their activities. 
Only a small subset of worker centers has successfully turned to private sec-
tor labor law to date.13 As one of our authors has argued elsewhere, worker 
centers could (and should) take more strategic advantage of the NLRA. Em-
ployees involved in worker centers that have turned to the NLRA “have 
generally fared well.”14 In the bulk of these cases, the NLRA’s enforcement 
agency found an employer had illegally interfered with collective activity and 
awarded remedies to the employees. These remedies include reinstatement 
and lost pay. Even so, only a small group of worker centers has used the 
carrot of private sector labor law to advance the interests of workers. 
These observations notwithstanding, employer groups and their Con-
gressional allies are raising questions about whether worker centers are sub-
ject to labor law’s restrictions on labor organizations (the stick). If employees 
engaged with worker centers can deploy the benefits of protections afforded 
by the NLRA’s labor policy (the carrot), can worker centers then avoid labor 
law’s many restrictions on associational activity and cumbersome reporting 
requirements for “labor organizations”? Or, can worker centers enjoy the rel-
ative freedom in their associational activity, and the less burdensome report-
ing requirements, accorded to non-profit associations and civil rights 
organizations?15 
The answers to these questions have implications for the future viability 
of American labor policy in the 21st century—most notably, its ability to 
offset inequality of bargaining power between employers and individual low-
wage workers (and the injustices such inequality fosters in the workplace). 
The application of labor law’s stick would be “fatal” for most worker centers, 
which do not have the financial resources or staff to respond.16 Worker cen-
FLSA’s legislative history instructs that formalities, like independent contractor labels, that 
businesses assign to a relationship should not exclude true employment relationships from the 
Act’s coverage.”).
13 Kati L. Griffith, Worker Centers and Labor Law Protections: Why Aren’t they Having 
Their Cake?, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 331, 336 (2015) (confirming only seven worker 
centers who have participated in “twelve different NLRB charges” and highlighting worker 
centers’ underutilization of the NLRA’s carrot).
14 Id. at 337–38 (describing the success of unfair labor practice charges before the National 
Labor Relations Board).
15 For other scholars who have signaled the importance of these questions, see Michael C. 
Duff, ALT-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 837, 853–60 (2014); Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Tradi-
tional Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 334-35 (2009); 
David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations - Until They Confront the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. OF  EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 472-74 (2006); Alan 
Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y. 
L. SCH. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (2006).
16 Estlund, supra note 8, at 229 (“[Labor law] burdens weigh heavily on traditional trade 
unions—with their thousands of members, millions of dollars in membership dues, and sizable 
organizations and staffs. These burdens would be fatal—as they are likely intended to be—for 
most worker centers.”). See also Catherine L. Fisk, Workplace Democracy and Democratic Worker 
Organizations: Notes on Worker Centers, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 101, 103-04 (2016) (mak-
605 
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ters that must respond to NLRA claims against them would need legal ad-
vocates to navigate the labor law bureaucracy successfully. If they must fulfill 
the reporting requirements of the NLRA, rather than the reporting require-
ments governing nonprofits, they would need more costly accounting 
assistance. 
This Article contends that the NLRA’s carrot extends to worker centers 
who organize NLRA “employees,” but the NLRA’s stick does not apply to 
the vast majority of centers because they are not “labor organizations” within 
the meaning of the Act.17 The “labor organization” designation does not, and 
should not, encompass every organization that works with individuals who 
enjoy the NLRA’s protections from employer retaliation for “employees” en-
gaged in group action (its carrot). 
Part I sets the stage for the law and policy debate about the application 
of labor law’s stick to worker centers as “labor organizations.” It clarifies that, 
as a legal matter, only organizations that “deal with” employers are labor 
organizations subject to labor law’s stick. Part II draws on our original re-
search into the filing practices and funding profiles of more than 100 worker 
centers to argue that the vast majority of worker centers are not set up to deal 
with employers, and thus are not labor organizations. 
Part III puts forth doctrinal arguments for our carrot-but-not-a-stick 
approach. It relies on First Amendment jurisprudence and Professor Cynthia 
Estlund’s theory of the “grand bargain” to argue that worker centers cannot 
be subject to labor law’s stick. Applying labor law’s restrictions on associa-
tional activity to worker centers, as we know them today, would run counter 
to First Amendment principles. The government can only place restrictions 
on organizations that actively seek to become the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representatives of employees. Part III also discusses the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s labor law jurisprudence to reveal that our carrot-but-not-a-
stick approach is in line with the NLRA’s fundamental goal of reducing the 
coercive effects of inequality on employer-employee relations. The U.S. 
Congress, with the NLRA, provided protections meant to strengthen, not 
weaken, nascent worker organizing efforts on behalf of vulnerable workers. 
Part IV presents policy rationales for our approach. A time series of 
income inequality shows that inequality today parallels inequality during the 
1930s. We are also currently in a historical moment of intense hostility to 
worker organizing and workers’ rights. The power of unions is in decline. In 
this context, worker centers can and should use the NLRA’s “carrot” on be-
half of the workers they assist and should not be subject to its “stick.” Our 
carrot-but-not-a-stick approach has implications for the vitality of American 
labor policy. It opens up space for emerging worker centers to expand their 
efforts to improve the working lives of the growing low-wage workforce. 
ing the case that we should consider the “legal regulation of organizational governance” for 
“new organizational models.”).
17 Fisk, supra note 16, at 116 (“Federal law regulates the internal affairs of labor organiza-
tions far more intensively than the internal affairs of almost any other private organization 
except a publicly traded corporation.”). 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\14-1\HLP106.txt unknown Seq: 6  4-NOV-19 13:46 
606 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 14 
I. THE DEBATE: ARE WORKER CENTERS LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 
“DEALING WITH” EMPLOYERS? 
The debate is not about the NLRA’s carrot. Employees are entitled to 
NLRA protections because of their status as employees, not the nature of 
the group with which they associate. Labor law’s protections apply when 
employees associate with a labor organization, a worker center, or without 
the involvement of any external organization. The key to labor law’s carrot is 
that employees engage in protected activity for mutual aid or protection.18 
The applicability of labor law’s stick, however, turns on something quite dif-
ferent. It requires the existence of a “labor organization,” and has generated 
considerable debate for more than a decade. 
In 2006, the agency that enforces restrictions on labor organizations’ 
associational activity under the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), issued guidance suggesting that it did not consider one of the most 
high-profile worker centers to be a labor organization.19 It concluded that 
the worker center involved in an employer complaint to the agency—the 
Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY)—was not an 
NLRA labor organization for purposes of the NLRA’s 8b restrictions on 
labor organizations engaged in picketing.20 
The NLRB concluded that the worker center’s negotiations with em-
ployers about a lawsuit settlement was not “a pattern or practice of dealing 
over time,” even though the settlement discussions “stretched over a period 
of time.”21 This was the case because the interactions related to a discrete 
issue, which was the worker center’s “attempts to enforce employment law.”22 
The NLRB came to this conclusion even though the settlement agreement 
created arbitration provisions as enforcement mechanisms that would involve 
ongoing interaction between the employers and the worker center. It rea-
soned that these lawsuit settlement provisions were “merely contract enforce-
ment mechanisms” rather than bilateral exchanges about other wages and 
18 29 U.S.C. § 157; Kati L. Griffith, Worker centers and labor law protections: Why aren’t 
they having their cake?, 36 BERKELEY J. OF EMP’T AND LABOR LAW 331 (2015) (illustrating 
the applicability of labor law’s protections and theorizing why worker centers do not take more 
advantage of these protections than they have to date); Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and 
Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 118-19 (1995) (NLRA “protects speech about 
unionization or other forms of employee representation, discussion of work-related grievances, 
and petitioning for their redress.”). 
19 Restaurant Opportunities Center of NY, 2006 NLRB GCM LEXIS 52 (2006) (em-
ployer alleged that worker center engaged in unlawful recognitional picketing and coerced 
employees, among other things). 
20 It also concluded that even if it was a labor organization, its pressure on the employer 
“to enter into lawsuit settlement agreements” that set forth “numerous terms and conditions of 
employment” did not amount to a violation of NLRA 8(b)(7)(C)’s restrictions on recognitional 
picketing. Restaurant Opportunities Center of NY, 2006 NLRB GCM LEXIS 52 (2006). 
21 Id. at *4-5. 
22 Id. at *5. 
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working conditions over time.23 As the NLRB put it, “[t]hey do not . . . 
contemplate any bilateral offer or consideration of new proposals.”24 
Two years later, in 2008, the federal agency in charge of overseeing 
labor organizations’ reporting and internal governance under the LMRDA 
similarly weighed in on ROC-NY’s status.25 This agency, the Department of 
Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards (DOL), concluded that 
ROC-NY did not qualify as a labor organization because it did not engage 
in grievance handling or other kinds of ongoing exchanges with employers.26 
However, these agency positions, and apparent agency reluctance to 
conclude that worker centers are labor organizations, have not settled the 
debate. Some continue to make the case that worker centers fit labor law 
definitions of “labor organizations” such that they are subject to labor law’s 
stick: the heightened NLRA 8b restrictions on associational activity and its 
burdensome reporting and internal governance requirements under the 
LMRDA.27 President Trump’s election in 2016 intensified debate about 
whether worker centers are labor organizations, subject to labor law’s stick.28 
Worker center critics hope that Trump’s administration will deem many 
worker centers as “labor organizations.”’29 
As a legal matter, the key to determining whether an organization is a 
“labor organization” is if it exists for the purpose of “dealing with employers” 
on issues such as wages and working conditions.30 Congress certainly in-
tended “dealing with” to cover collective bargaining, as well as ongoing ex-
changes between employers and worker organizations about wages and 
working conditions.31 Case law in this area establishes that “dealing with” 
encompasses “a pattern of bilateral exchange between employee groups and 
23 Id. at *6. 
24 Id. 
25 Letter from Andrew Davis, Policy and Law Advisor, Division of Interpretations and 
Standards, to Beverly Walker, Chief, Division of Interpretations and Standards (Jan. 16, 
2008). 
26 See id. 
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (2012) (“‘Labor organization’ means a labor organization en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce and includes any organization of any kind, any 
agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which 
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or 
conditions of employment”). 
28 See Benn Penn & Jacquie Lee, ‘Worker Center or Union’ Probe May be Sign of Things to 
Come, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY  LABOR  REP. (March 15, 2018, 8:41 AM), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/worker-center-or-union-probe-may-be-sign-of-
things-to-come [https://perma.cc/FG6G-QY9A]. 
29 Id. 
30 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012). Labor law restrictions on internal governance and reporting 
adds the additional element of requiring the group to be “engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce” to satisfy the definition. 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 402(j) 
(2012) (further defining industry affecting commerce). 
31 See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211–13 (1959) (“dealing with” includes 
employer exchanges with an employee committee about terms or conditions of employment); 
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992) (same); NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. 
Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262, 1271 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f there are only isolated instances in which 
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employers.”32 Many of these cases involve employer-created committees and 
whether they were “labor organizations” that the employer had illegally in-
terfered with (in violation of the NLRA’s company union prohibition). In 
Cabot Carbon, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that employer exchanges 
with an internal employee committee about terms and conditions of employ-
ment constituted “dealing with.”33 
Thus, the debate ultimately concentrates on what Congress meant by 
“dealing with employers.” Did it mean to cover groups, like worker centers, 
that lack an intent to engage in ongoing interactions with particular employ-
ers but try numerous strategies to improve wages and working conditions for 
low-wage workers? Worker advocates and their policymaking allies answer 
this question in the negative, characterizing “dealing with” more narrowly 
than their opponents. They allege that groups only “deal with” employers 
when they engage with particular employers over time, such as when they 
handle employer-employee grievances or attempt to secure a contract (a col-
lective bargaining agreement) with an employer. 
The Executive Director of the Korean Immigrant Workers’ Association 
(KIWA), for example, characterized KIWA as a worker center, not a union, 
because of its focus on community issues rather than collective bargaining 
outcomes.34 She stated that she aims to promote workers’ rights in general, 
but not to engage in ongoing negotiations with employers about contracts or 
to process grievances.35 Ana Avenda ˜no, then the AFL-CIO Director of Im-
migration and Community Action, said that the distinguishing feature of 
worker centers is representation.36 Worker centers, she said, are community 
organizations that serve the needs of workers, while labor organizations re-
present workers with respect to their employers.37 
Business groups, conservative think tanks, and their allies in Congress 
characterize “dealing with” more broadly. They argue that worker centers 
“deal with” employers because they continuously pressure employers to im-
prove wages and working conditions.38 A January 2018 letter from Republi-
the group makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management response or 
acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.”). 
32 Estlund, supra note 8, at 229 (analyzing the relevant precedent). 
33 360 U.S. at 204–05, 214. 
34 Gayle Cinquegrani, House Republicans Ask Perez to Clarify LMRDA Filing Terms for 
Worker Centers, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY  LABOR  REP. (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:00 AM), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/house-republicans-ask-perez-to-clarify-lmrda-fil 
ing-terms-for-worker-centers [ht tps://perma.cc/6SPK-EAU7]. 
35 Id. 
36 Gayle Cinquegrani, Worker Centers Provide Necessary Outreach, Supporters Say: Opponents 
See LMRDA Issue, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LABOR REP. (Nov. 27, 2003, 12:00 AM), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/worker-centers-provide-necessary-outreach-sup 
porters-say-opponents-see-lmrda-issue [https://perma.cc/5779-HFLZ]. 
37 Id. 
38 Ben Penn, U.S. Chamber Report Casts Worker Centers As Means for Unions to Circumvent 
NLRA, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LABOR REP. (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://news.bloom 
berglaw.com/daily-labor-report/us-chamber-report-casts-worker-centers-as-means-for-unions 
-to-circumvent-nlra [https://perma.cc/D84K-EM9H]; Stephen Lee, Worker Centers Push Back 
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can legislators on the US House of Representatives’ Committee on 
Education and the Workforce (“House Workforce Committee”) asserted 
that worker centers deal with employers and are essentially “union fronts” 
funded and/or controlled by unions.39 Worker center critics allege that these 
groups are labor organizations because they engage in picketing and boycott 
activity, some of which is NLRA 8b-restricted for labor organizations.40 In 
2018, the DOL was asked to investigate the Centro de Trabajadores Unidos 
en Lucha (CTUL-Center for Workers United in Struggle), in part because 
it used a secondary boycott to pressure retailers to use union labor.41 
Along similar lines, in July 2013, two Republican legislators from the 
House Workforce Committee wrote to the DOL alleging that worker cen-
ters are indeed labor organizations because (similar to unions) they engage in 
industry wide organizing, push for legislative change, and engage in picket-
ing and boycotting as a strategy.42 It noted that KIWA picketed and boy-
cotted over a dozen restaurants to help organize low-wage workers and to 
improve their wages. The DOL responded, however, by clarifying that 
worker centers do not become labor organizations “simply by engaging in the 
Against Allegations of Being Union ‘Front Groups,’ BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LABOR REP. (Aug. 
13, 2013, 12:00 AM) (noting that House republicans and a business group called Center for 
Union Facts argue that worker centers are skirting labor regulations), https:// 
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/worker-centers-push-back-against-allegations-of-
being-union-front-groups [https://perma.cc/56V9-Z3PD]. A business advocate contended 
that unions have “hijacked” worker centers because they are “more publicly acceptable” to the 
broader public. Martin Berman-Gorvine, At SHRM Meeting, Worker Centers Draw Ire of In-
dustry Executives, Management Attorney, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY  LABOR  REP. (March 19, 
2014, 12:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/at-shrm-meeting-
worker-centers-draw-ire-of-industry-executives-management-attorney [https://perma.cc/ 
PWN5-FDRF]; Ben Penn, Chamber Turns up Heat on Labor Dept. to Probe Worker Centers (1), 
BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LABOR REP. (April 25, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw. 
com/daily-labor-report/chamber-turns-up-heat-on-labor-dept-to-probe-worker-centers-1 
[https://perma.cc/DR37-5MUF] (U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a report on April 25, 
2018 saying that the DOL should probe whether or not certain worker centers are “labor 
organizations”). 
39 Letter from the Comm. Educ. & Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, to Alex-
ander Acosta, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Jan. 18, 2018) (“[S]o-called worker centers have become 
front groups controlled by big labor special interests and [under the Obama administration] 
were largely allowed to operate outside of the legal requirements [of the LMRDA]”), https:// 
republicansedlabor.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=402413 [https:// 
perma.cc/974B-464C]. 
40 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2012). 
41 Penn & Lee, supra note 28. For more on the debate see Janice Fine, New Forms to Settle 
Old Scores: Updating the Worker Centre Story in the United States, 66 INDUS. REL. 604, 605–06 
(2011); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, The New Model of Representation: An Overview of Lead-
ing Worker Centers 1–2 (2014). 
42 Letter From Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, US House of Representatives to 
Thomas Perez, US Dep’t of Labor (July 23, 2013), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/ 
files/09-19-13-dol-worker_center_follow-up_with_enclosure_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/92GS-
N3MX]; Cinquegrani, supra note 34; Memorandum from Brian V. Kennedy, Assistant Sec’y, 
Office of Cong. & Intergovernmental Affairs, to John Kline, Chairman, Comm. on Educ. & 
the Workforce (August 26, 2013). 
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routine activities of legal service providers and activities targeting employers 
such as picketing, handbilling, and protesting”43 
In the sections that follow, we take up the question raised by this debate 
and argue that worker centers do not “deal with” employers in the labor law 
sense. As a result, they are not subject to labor law’s stick. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH: WORKER CENTERS ARE NOT SET 
UP TO “DEAL WITH” EMPLOYERS 
Our original empirical research on worker centers’ legal filings with the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) illustrates that most worker centers are not 
set up to “deal with” employers. Admittedly, whether a particular worker 
group “deals with” an employer will ultimately depend on the adjudication of 
particular facts considered on a case-by-case basis. There are some similari-
ties across the vast majority of worker centers, however, that permit us to 
make some useful generalizations about labor law’s applicability. For exam-
ple, as we will elaborate upon below, the vast majority of centers pursue 
missions that are broader than dealings with particular employers. Moreover, 
most are too small, and too dependent on external funders, to engage in 
ongoing dealings with particular employers about wages and working 
conditions. 
For the remainder of the Article we will continue to use the umbrella 
term “worker centers” to refer to the large subset of worker centers that look 
like nonprofit organizations. We are not referring to the small subset of or-
ganizations that call themselves “worker centers,” but are really subsidiaries 
of labor unions or are actively engaging in collective bargaining with employ-
ers. For our organizational research, we collected data on Janice Fine and 
Nik Theodore’s comprehensive list of all worker centers (as of 2012) from 
government and other relevant sources.44 We found IRS data for 104 non-
profit worker centers in 2012, which represented 60% of the groups in Fine 
and Theodore’s list. We confirmed that an additional 23% of groups on their 
2012 list functioned as non-profit organizations, even though they were IRS 
exempt from filing as non-profits. The latter worker centers did not need to 
file with the IRS because they were part of larger non-profits, too small, or 
43 Cinquegrani, supra note 36. In other words, for the DOL, engaging in tactics such as 
picketing and boycotting to pressure a particular employer did not amount to “dealing with” a 
particular employer for labor law purposes. 
44 See Janice Fine and Nik Theodore, Worker Centers 2012—Community Based and Worker 
Led Organizations, RUTGERS  UNIVERSITY  CENTER FOR  REMOTE  SENSING AND  SPATIAL 
AWARENESS, (2013), http://bit.ly/2JLVQXS [https://perma.cc/NXU6-C3ZR]. We collected 
data on revenue and funding sources from the US Internal Revenue Service, the US Depart-
ment of Labor and the Foundation Directory Online database. For more information about 
our research see Leslie C. Gates et al., Sizing Up Worker Center Income (2008-2014): A Study of 
Revenue Size, Stability and Streams, in NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, 
POLICY AND MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE 39–40 (2018). 
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fit an IRS filing exemption (e.g. for religious organizations).45 These IRS 
filings are helpful data sources because they require yearly reporting on orga-
nizational purposes, budgets and general categories of income sources. 
A. Do Not Exhibit Purposes to “Deal With” Employers 
The IRS filings we studied portray that worker centers provide services 
for vulnerable populations of working people, rather than existing for the 
purpose (in whole or in part) of dealing with particular employers over 
time.46 For instance, almost 60% of the 104 worker centers that filed an IRS 
990 form in 2012 reported income from program services that they provided 
to low-wage workers and their communities. 
A comprehensive review of worker centers’ mission statements con-
firmed that even those worker centers that did not gain revenue from pro-
gram services described services to the low-wage public as key to their 
organizational missions. This is not particularly surprising, given that the 
IRS’ nonprofit tax exempt status partially relies on centers’ provision of ser-
vices to the “poor,” the “distressed,” and the “underprivileged.”47 While IRS 
and labor law have their own unique set of definitions, labor law’s stick has 
not traditionally applied to nonprofit organizations whose purpose is to help 
the poor and vulnerable. This has been the case even when those organiza-
tions work with some individuals who enjoy NLRA protections as 
“employees.” 
Worker centers do more than provide services and advocate for workers’ 
interests at the firm level. They are also social movement organizations48 that 
seek broader societal change.49 Our review of worker center purposes re-
vealed that worker centers often focus on large-scale concerns such as ame-
liorating income inequality in the U.S., promoting humane immigration 
policies at the state and federal levels, and addressing racial injustice in the 
45 Fifteen percent did not file because they were part of larger nonprofits, 5 percent did 
not file because the federal government does not require small nonprofits to file (those with 
budgets less than $50,000) and 3 percent did not file because their religious purposes exempts 
them from filing. Gates et al., supra note 44, at 41. 
46 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE 
L. J. 891, 912–23 (2008) (describing collaborations between worker centers and public interest 
lawyers to enforce low-wage workers’ rights).
47 Gates et al., supra note 44, at 52. 
48 Julie Yates Rivchin, Some Legal Considerations for Organizing Structures and Strategies, 
28 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 397, 400 (2004) (“Workers’ centers are typically based in 
specific ethnic communities and draw much of their strength from having deep roots in those 
particular communities. Within the workers’ center model there are variations . . . some work-
ers’ centers focus solely on issues of workplace justice, others are components of broader com-
munity organizations”).
49 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Work-
place Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 429 (1995). 
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workplace.50 Their efforts have helped to put “issues about low-wage work 
and the shrinking middle class at the forefront of public debate.”51 
Drawing on participant observation of a Chicago worker center and the 
sociological literature, Professor Ce´sar F. Rosado Marza´n contrasts worker 
centers with labor unions, describing the former as “rich in social and sym-
bolic capital.”52 There may be exceptions, such as worker centers that are a 
legal subsidiary of a labor union, but worker centers generally do not intend 
to limit their activities to ongoing dealings with employers; nor do they in-
tend to become the collective bargaining representatives of the majority of 
workers at a particular establishment.53 
B. Too Small to “Deal With” Employers 
Our organizational research into worker center funding revealed that 
worker centers tend to be small organizations, similar to other nonprofits.54 
Unlike labor unions, worker centers do not tend to have the funding capacity 
to engage in ongoing dealings with employers on behalf of their worker con-
stituents. Worker centers as we know them today do not, then, generally 
have the financial capacity to engage in collective bargaining, administer 
contracts, or repeatedly negotiate with particular employers—even if they 
wanted to. 
As Figure 1 shows, the median worker center’s annual budget in 2012 
was $410,000.55 Even if we compare this median to small labor union locals, 
we see how much smaller worker centers tend to be. A UNITE-HERE 
Local in Chicago reported a revenue of $9 million in 2012.56 According to 
Figure 1, only a handful of worker centers in 2012 had revenue that exceeded 
$1 million. An even more striking contrast is to the Service Employee Inter-
national Union, which reported a total of $78 million in 2012.57 
50 See generally FINE, supra note 2. 
51 Fisk, supra note 16, at 102 (describing worker center success at raising wages through 
statutory reform at the state and local level and by “putting issues about low-wage work and 
the shrinking middle class at the forefront of public debate.”).
52 Ce´sar F. Rosado Marza´n, Worker Centers and the Moral Economy: Disrupting through 
Brokerage, Prestige, and Moral Framing, 2017 U CHI. LEGAL FORUM 409, 411 (2017) (“Social 
capital enables worker centers to construct effective political coalitions. Symbolic capital lends 
prestige to the worker center and helps it to draw significant public attention. Finally, worker 
centers can frame issues in broad, moral ways that help them to garner popular support. Broad 
moral framing contributes to a rekindling of social and legal norms for a worker-based moral 
economy.”).
53 Naduris-Weissman, supra note 15 at 238 (2009); Richard B. Freeman, What Can Labor 
Organizations Do for U.S. Workers When Unions Can’t Do What Unions Used to Do?, in WHAT 
WORKS FOR  WORKERS?: PUBLIC  POLICIES AND  INNOVATIVE  STRATEGIES FOR  LOW-
WAGE WORKERS 50, 64 (Stephanie Luce et al. eds., 2014).
54 KIRSTEN A. GRøNBJERG, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT FUNDING xi (1993).
55 Gates et al. supra note 44, at 43. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF WORKER CENTERS BY TOTAL REVENUE, 
2012 
What our organizational research portrays is that the vast majority of 
worker centers today do not have the capacity to engage in collective bar-
gaining or other ongoing dealings with particular employers. 
C. Too Reliant on External Funding to Deal With Employers 
Worker centers’ reliance on external, rather than internal, sources is an-
other indicator that worker centers are not set up to “deal with” employers in 
the labor law sense. Reliance on external sources is a typical characteristic of 
all nonprofits.58 Indeed, more than 80% of worker center income in our 
study came from external sources such as government and foundation grants 
and charitable donations from individuals.59 In contrast, worker centers in 
our study reported that less than 2% of their income came from dues paid to 
them by their organizational membership.60 
Reliance on government or foundation grants can orient the group to 
efforts that will “please” funders and respond to priorities that are set outside 
of the organizations’ constituents.61 Government grants focus on things like 
facilitating the government’s workplace health and safety enforcement, and 
most foundations are interested in economic justice outside of the collective 
58 GRøNBJERG, supra note 54, at 72. 
59 Gates et al., supra note 44, at 50. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 55–56. 
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bargaining context. Lack of internal funding sources makes it more challeng-
ing for worker centers to represent employees in ongoing dealings with par-
ticular employers. 
Thus, the purposes and size of worker centers and their sources of 
funding support the view that most worker centers are not set up to “deal 
with” employers. Worker centers do not dedicate their efforts to, nor do they 
have the capacity to, engage in ongoing interaction with individual employ-
ers over time—the activities that have traditionally justified the application 
of labor law’s limitations to certain organizations. Therefore, labor law’s stick 
is not appropriate as worker centers do not “deal with” employers in the ways 
labor law contemplates. 
III. LEGAL DOCTRINAL RATIONALES FOR INTERPRETING “DEALING 
WITH” TO EXCLUDE WORKER CENTERS 
Thus far, we have used our organizational research to characterize 
worker centers as not having the organizational purposes or capacity to “deal 
with” employers. Here, we advance two legal doctrinal rationales based on 
constitutional law and labor law. While both of our doctrinal rationales spe-
cifically address the NLRA, but not the LMRDA, they implicate the defini-
tion of labor organization under both statutes. This is the case because the 
LMRDA’s definition of labor organization is narrower than the NLRA’s 
definition and the U.S. DOL does consider NLRB determinations in its 
own reviews of labor organization status.62 
A. Constitutional Law Only Permits Labor Law’s Stick in Exchange for 
Collective Bargaining Privileges 
Constitutional law protects worker centers from being subject to labor 
law’s limitations on associational activity like boycotts and picketing. In 
these situations, the First Amendment requires that we interpret “dealing 
with” more narrowly to include only organizations engaged in the enterprise 
of collective bargaining.63 
Voluntary associations that are not labor organizations enjoy considera-
ble First Amendment protections of their organizing activity. For instance, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case involving the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), held that the First Amendment 
protects civil rights picketing in support of a secondary boycott from govern-
62 Naduris-Weissman, supra note 15, at 273. 
63 See Duff, supra note 15, at 860 (“Courts have previously utilized avoidance canons when 
interpreting portions of the NLRA that might have rendered predominantly expressive activity 
unlawful under the statute. . . . Broadly interpreting the labor organization definition in such a 
way as to convert social advocacy groups into labor organizations subject to NLRA injunction 
carries obvious chilling potential. Therefore, courts may in protest contexts interpret the defi-
nition of “labor organization” narrowly once it is clear that there is no union activity 
involved.”). 
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ment interference.64 The NLRA would prohibit this activity if it was initi-
ated by a “labor organization.” Nonetheless, because the NAACP was not a 
“labor organization,” the First Amendment’s full protection applied to the 
NAACP. The principles that apply to the NAACP should apply to worker 
centers.65 
Labor scholars have roundly critiqued the NLRA’s 8b restrictions on 
unions’ associational activity, with some arguing that these restrictions are 
unconstitutional as applied to labor organizations.66 There are serious Con-
stitutional questions about the application of labor law’s stick to union activ-
ity. Professor Cynthia Estlund provides a potentially viable doctrinal reason 
for restricting First Amendment protections for labor organizations’ associa-
tional activity. Her rationale relies on collective bargaining protections as an 
offset. Specifically, Estlund argues that because the law provides additional 
powers to unions beyond the carrot, it may be constitutional to curtail their 
powers in other ways.67 One notable benefit is that employers are legally 
required to bargain with unions once the union gains majority support.68 
Estlund calls this compromise the “grand bargain” and proposes that it is a 
way of understanding labor law’s misfit with Constitutional principles that 
apply to all other private voluntary associations in the United States.69 She 
notes, “unions’ unusual legal privileges and powers might justify some of the 
unusual restrictions on their freedom and autonomy.”70 
Labor law restrictions, and other exceptions to First Amendment pro-
tections, are incongruous with worker centers as we know them today. While 
they enjoy the carrot of employee protection from employer retaliation, they 
64 See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
65 For an argument that recent First Amendment jurisprudence supports treating worker 
centers differently see Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organiza-
tion Cooperation, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1464 (2016) (“While this Court’s First Amend-
ment is commonly understood to help corporations over workers, it may also be a tool with 
which to challenge and creatively destroy bans on company support that are, today, not only 
impediments to the development of new forms of worker organizations but are also good for 
companies that promote themselves as doing well by their workers . . .”).
66 Crain & Matheny, supra note 1, at 562–65 (contending that labor rights should be 
reframed as “assembly rights” to expand labor rights and to buttress our democracy as well as 
our democratic institutions); Hallett, supra note 10, at 511 (using constitutional arguments to 
give labor more protection, what she calls “a labor organizing privilege”).
67 Estlund, supra note 8, at 169. 
68 Id. at 193 (“The sui generis powers and privileges of unions under the NLRA were 
chiefly embodied in the original Wagner Act of 1935, which imposed a duty on employers to 
recognize a union selected by a majority of workers in an appropriate bargaining unit as the 
exclusive representative of all workers in the bargaining unit, whether union members or not, 
and a duty to bargain with that union in good faith.”). See also Fisk, supra note 16, at 116 
(“[T]he goal of the legal regulation is to force unions to govern themselves so as to protect 
dissenting employees, and the law does so because unions are the exclusive representatives of 
employees with the power to affect conditions of employment and also to waive individual 
employee rights.”).
69 Estlund, supra note 8, at 177–78 (“The claim that worker centers are ‘labor organiza-
tions’ under the NLRA attempts to divorce labor law’s quid from its quo—to impose the 
extraordinary restrictions of federal labor law on voluntary associations of workers that neither 
exercise nor claim the special privileges and powers of unions.”).
70 Id. at 177. 
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should not be subject to the labor organization stick. Because worker centers 
do not seek the powerful benefits of mandatory bargaining and exclusive 
representation that labor unions enjoy, there is no (even arguable) legal justi-
fication for limiting their full freedom of assembly under the Constitution. 
Thus, worker centers should be subject to the same Constitutional entitle-
ments as other nonprofits and voluntary associations. 
Even if our argument about a conflict with the First Amendment is 
disputable, deeming worker centers as labor organizations would at mini-
mum raise a constitutional question. Thus, the constitutional avoidance doc-
trine would call for protecting worker centers from labor law’s stick. Since 
the meaning of “deal with” is ambiguous, the constitutional avoidance doc-
trine requires a narrow interpretation of its meaning. Such an interpretation 
would protect worker centers from labor law’s stick. As we show next, labor 
law itself provides another justification for protecting worker centers from 
labor law’s stick. 
B. Labor Law’s Inequality of Bargaining Power Purpose Forbids Use of 
Labor Law’s Stick on Worker Centers 
A key purpose of labor law, to offset inequality of bargaining power, 
counsels against the application of labor law’s stick to worker centers. It in-
structs us, similar to constitutional law, to have a narrower interpretation of 
“dealing with” in the worker center context. Worker centers organize eco-
nomically vulnerable workers, which means they work to offset inequality of 
bargaining power even though they are not organizations set up to deal with 
particular employers. 
As we will detail below, the U.S. Supreme Court’s labor law jurispru-
dence confirms the expansiveness of labor law’s goal to offset inequality of 
bargaining power, to enhance protections for vulnerable workers outside of 
the labor union context, and to infuse consideration of inequality of bargain-
ing power into labor law interpretations, especially before the collective bar-
gaining stage. 
1. Inequality of Bargaining Power is Fundamental Purpose
 The NLRA’s underlying inequality of bargaining power rationale was/is 
that individual vulnerable workers may accept sweatshop conditions created 
by “chiselers” (as they had been known during the Great Depression era)71 if 
those conditions were a requirement of gaining employment. But, Congress 
posited, groups of workers would be in a better position to demand humane 
wages and working conditions if they confronted their employers through 
71 Anne Marie Lofaso, Jobs and the American Worker: What We Owe Our Coal Miners, 5 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 95–96 (2011) (connecting inequality of bargaining purposes to 
“the lack of economic diversification, a dearth of job opportunities, health and safety risks 
inherent to one of the region’s higher paying jobs—combined with a history of worker ex-
ploitation and hostility to workers’ attempts to help themselves.”). 
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collective actions. Congress intended to empower employees and their nas-
cent organizing efforts to address the injustices that arise from employers’ 
superior market power over workers.72 Worker centers do just that. 
Some downplay the NLRA’s purpose to redress unequal bargaining 
power and concentrate more on the NLRA’s purpose to promote industrial 
peace.73 Nonetheless, its salience as a fundamental underlying labor law pol-
icy is indisputable given that the need to address inequality of bargaining 
power is stated in the statute itself.74 Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly affirmed Congress’ purpose of equalizing bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees over the decades since the NLRA’s enact-
ment,75 and has referred to it as “fundamental” to labor policy.76 
2. Enhanced Protections for Organizing Before Collective Bargaining 
The U.S. Supreme Court has deemed that inequality of bargaining 
power merits enhanced protections for activity that occurs among employees 
who are acting collectively but are not represented by a union.77 In Washing-
ton Aluminum Co., a seminal labor law case, the Court concluded that a 
72 Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 B.U. L. REV. 
293, 334-35, 368-70 (1993) (advancing that NLRA does not promote employee loyalty but 
instead intends to strengthen employees’ protections); Sergio Gamonal & Cesar F. Rosado 
Marzan, Protecting Workers as a Matter of Principle: A Latin American View of U.S. Work, 13 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 605, 647-49 (2014) (emphasizing statutory language on 
this point).
73 Branscomb, supra note 72, at 334-35, 368–70 (1993) (describing scholarship that de-
emphasizes inequality of bargaining power purpose and instead emphasizes industrial peace).
74 29 U.S.C. § 151. See also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609 (1991) (“In § 1 
of the NLRA Congress made the legislative finding that the “inequality of bargaining power” 
between unorganized employees and corporate employers had adversely affected commerce and 
declared it to be the policy of the United States to mitigate or eliminate those adverse effects 
‘“by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the 
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.’ ”).
75 See, e.g., Am. Comm. Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1950) (“That Act was 
designed to remove obstructions caused by strikes and other forms of industrial unrest, which 
Congress found were attributable to the inequality of bargaining power between unorganized 
employees and their employers. It did so by strengthening employee groups, by restraining 
certain employer practices, and by encouraging the processes of collective bargaining.”); Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 609 (same); Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 253 n.1 (1996) 
(same); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 75354 (1985) (same).
76 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1975) (referring to inequality of 
bargaining power as a fundamental right); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 
33 (1937) (same); Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The 
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2007) (“The main object of labour 
law has always been . . . to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining 
power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship.”); Andrias, 
supra note 1 at 9 (describes “labor law’s most fundamental commitments” as achieving “greater 
economic and political equality in society.”).
77 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 99 (2013) (referring 
to Washington Aluminum and stating that the “Court has held that walkouts, with or without 
the presence of the union, are protected activity regardless of the judges’ view about the wis-
dom of the action.”). 
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group of non-union workers who spontaneously walked out of their factory 
to protest extremely cold conditions engaged in NLRA protected activity. In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court invoked the vulnerability of the unrep-
resented employees.78 It stated: 
The seven employees here were part of a small group of employees 
who were wholly unorganized. They had no bargaining represen-
tative . . . to present their grievances to their employer. Under 
these circumstances, they had to speak for themselves as best they 
could. . . . [A]fter talking among themselves, they walked out to-
gether in the hope that this action might spotlight their complaint 
and bring about some improvement in what they considered to be 
the “miserable” conditions of their employment.79 
The Court concluded that this was protected concerted activity because 
the workers did not yet have a union. The Court’s reliance on the lack of a 
union signals that the Court would have employed a more limited view of 
protection if there had been a union in place. Unionized workers would, as 
the Washington Aluminum Court put it, have a representative that could 
“present their grievances to their employer.” 
3. Inequality of Bargaining Power Purpose as Key Interpretive Tool 
Before Collective Bargaining Stage 
Inequality of bargaining power is so salient to labor policy that the 
Court uses it as an interpretive tool when applying the NLRA. This is espe-
cially the case before the employees have reached the collective bargaining 
stage. 
The Court, for example, instructed the NLRB to consider this purpose 
when it interprets the impact of employer statements on employees. In the 
worker center context this would mean interpreting the NLRA’s labor or-
ganization definition to exclude worker centers. In Gissel Packing Co., the 
Court stated that the NLRB should account for power imbalances when 
considering whether an employer’s statement before a union election is an 
implicit threat of retaliation. In other words, rather than considering how an 
objective person would interpret seemingly benign predictions about the ef-
fects of unionization, the Court concluded that the NLRB should consider 
how an economically dependent worker would interpret the statements.80 
78 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
79 Id. at 14–15. 
80 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969). The Court stated, “Any 
assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context 
of its labor relations setting. . . [It] must take into account the economic dependence of the 
employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that rela-
tionship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by 
a more disinterested ear. Stating these obvious principles is but another way of recognizing that 
what is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship between 
the employer, his economically dependent employee and his union agent, not the election of 
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They might be more prone to “pick up intended implications” of the em-
ployer’s statement that otherwise might “be more readily dismissed by a 
more disinterested ear.”81 
In another seminal labor law case, the Court concluded that the NLRB 
should even broadly consider the inequality of bargaining power of union 
represented workers in some circumstances. In J. Weingarten Inc., the Court 
concluded that a represented employee has the right to bring a union repre-
sentative with him/her in an investigatory interview that could result in dis-
ciplinary action or discharge. The Court largely relied on the underlying 
policy of the Act stating, that 
[r]equiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview 
which he reasonably believes may result in the imposition of disci-
pline perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate, 
and bars recourse to the safeguards the Act provided “to redress 
the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and 
management.”82 
Those arguing for the need to apply Weingarten rights to all employees, even 
non-union employees, similarly call upon the NLRA’s inequality of bargain-
ing power rationale.83 
Supreme Court case law on whether particular workers are “employees” 
shows a similar concern with the vulnerability of the workers involved and an 
expansive consideration of inequality of bargaining power. In a case declar-
ing that unauthorized immigrant workers can be NLRA “employees” with 
collective action rights under the Act, the Court harkened back to the 
NLRA’s goal of reducing the imbalance in bargaining power. It reasoned 
that if the NLRA withholds protections, this would create a “subclass” of 
workers. The “subclass” of unauthorized immigrant workers would be prob-
lematic for labor policy because they would not have “a comparable stake in 
the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers” and because their 
legislators or the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimately defined and 
where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a class 
freer to talk.” Id. 
81 Id. 
82 J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261–62 (1975) (quoting Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB., 380 
U.S. 300, 316 (1965)). See also NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 
(1984) (“Against this background, it is evident that, in enacting § 7 of the NLRA, Congress 
sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the employee with that of his employer by 
allowing employees to band together in confronting an employer regarding the terms and 
conditions of their employment. There is no indication that Congress intended to limit this 
protection to situations in which an employee’s activity and that of his fellow employees com-
bine with one another in any particular way. Nor, more specifically, does it appear that Con-
gress intended to have this general protection withdrawn in situations in which a single 
employee, acting alone, participates in an integral aspect of a collective process.”).
83 See Christine Neylon O’Brien, When Union Members in a Members-Only Non-Majority 
Union (MONMU) Want Weingarten Rights: How High will the Blue Eagle Fly?, 10 U. PA J. 
BUS. & EMP. L. 599, 621–22 (2008) (arguing that conclusion that individual employees have a 
right to union representation at investigatory interviews relates to the idea of inequality of 
bargaining power). 
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inferior rights would create incentives for employers to prefer the unautho-
rized population over the authorized population.84 
Inequality of bargaining power shows up in other Court interpretations 
of “employee” status as well. In E.C. Atkins & Co., the Court concluded that 
private plant guards were employees because of the “inequality of bargaining 
power [they experience] and [because] their need for collective action paral-
lels that of other employees” under the NLRA.85 In a case concluding that 
retired employees were no longer NLRA “employees,” the Court’s rationale 
relied on the inapplicability of the NLRA’s inequality of bargaining power 
purpose to that population.86 It stated that “[t]he inequality of bargaining 
power that Congress sought to remedy was that of the “ ‘working man.”87 
There are Supreme Court cases that deemphasize inequality of bargain-
ing power, but they are not applicable to nonprofit associations (like worker 
centers) that do not aim to become collective bargaining representatives. 
These cases de-emphasize the NLRA’s inequality of bargaining power pur-
pose once a labor organization becomes the collective bargaining representa-
tive of a majority of employees and the employer has a legal duty to bargain 
with it. Once unions have reached the collective bargaining stage, these court 
rationales posit, employees have the “opportunity to deal on equality with 
their employer.”88 Thus, in the eyes of the Court, the NLRA’s purpose to 
offset power imbalances largely has been realized in such cases. 
In Insurance Agents’ Int’l Union, the Court used this reasoning to justify 
a holding that the NLRB should have a hands-off approach to regulating 
84 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984). But see Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds vs. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 139 (2002) (leaving Sure-Tan’s holding on employee status 
intact but removing unauthorized employees’ access to NLRB back pay remedy when they 
suffer a labor law violation).
85 NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 404 (1947). The court went on to reason 
that “[w]ithout collective bargaining, they are subject to the unilateral determination by the 
employer of their wages, hours, seniority, tenure and other conditions of work”. Id. But see 
Sergional Gamonal C. & Ce´sar F. Rosado Marza´n, PRINCIPLED LABOR LAW: U.S. LABOR 
LAW THROUGH A LATIN AMERICAN METHOD (forthcoming in 2019) (describing restriction 
of using the NLRA’s purposes to answer questions of employee versus independent contractor 
status). Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage under the National Labor Relations 
Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-like Persons, 
66 U. DET. L. REV. 555, 560 (1989) (same).
86 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 
U.S. 157, 166 (1971). For another broad reading of the scope of employee see Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 437 U. S. 556, 567 (1978).
87 Allied Chem. 404 U.S. at 166. Scholars have similarly argued for labor law’s inclusion of 
now-exempt groups, such as domestic workers who take care of children or the aged, because 
those groups are particularly vulnerable and face extreme inequalities of bargaining power. See, 
e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Ap-
proaches to Employee Representation, 21 N.C. L. REV. 45, 109-10 (2000) (arguing for NLRA 
coverage of domestic workers because they are a group with very little bargaining power); 
Michael C. Duff, Union Salts as Administrative Private Attorneys General, 32 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 2 (2011) (“[S]alts have served a legitimate function that is often over-
looked: by exposing unlawful, anti-union employment practices - especially unlawful hiring 
practices - salts facilitate the implementation of federal labor law policies designed to maintain 
industrial peace and to equalize employee bargaining power.”).
88 NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 506 (1960). 
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bargaining and thus should not find bad faith bargaining based on a union’s, 
or an employer’s, use of economic pressure. The Insurance Agents Court, in 
1960, noted that inequality of bargaining power has less salience once the 
parties are at the bargaining table. It stated: 
In view of the economic and political strength which has thereby 
come to unions, interpretations of the Act ought not to proceed on 
the assumption that it actively throws its weight on the side of 
unionism in order to redress an assumed inequality of bargaining 
power.89 
In a collective bargaining labor law case from 1981, First National 
Maintenance Corp.,90 the Supreme Court again downplayed inequality of bar-
gaining power at the bargaining stage. That case set out a legal principle for 
determining when an employer decision to close part of its business is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining that an employer must bargain about in 
good faith. The First National Maintenance legal principle gives more con-
sideration to employer business interests, and less consideration to inequality 
of bargaining power, in part because the “inequalities” that the Act meant to 
redress are less of a concern at the bargaining stage of the relationship.91 
In sum, worker centers squarely address the central purpose of the 
NLRA: to offset inequality of bargaining power. As we established above, 
however, they do so not by aiming to represent workers in collective bargain-
ing or other ongoing dealings with particular employers. Instead, they en-
gage with workers who are more akin to the loose-knit workers in 
Washington Aluminum that walked out of their workplace due to the intoler-
ably cold conditions on that Chicago morning. As we will elaborate upon 
next, the fact that worker centers endeavor to offset the weak bargaining 
power of some of the nation’s most vulnerable, underrepresented, employees 
at a time of heightened inequality and hostility against workers’ rights fur-
ther underscores the relevance of extending worker centers the carrot of labor 
law, without subjecting them to labor law’s stick. 
IV. POLICY RATIONALES FOR INTERPRETING “DEALING WITH” TO 
EXCLUDE WORKER CENTERS 
Along with legal arguments, there are normative policy rationales sup-
porting our carrot-but-not-a-stick approach. Worker centers should enjoy 
the carrot, but not the stick, of labor law because they assist some of the 
most vulnerable workers and do so at a time of heightened inequality of 
bargaining power. Indeed, the inequality of bargaining power between work-
ers and employers today is by some measures comparable to, if not worse 
than, the inequality which the NLRA’s architects sought to rectify. Further-
89 Id. at 507. 
90 See First Nat’l Maint. Corp v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 683 (1981).
91 Id. at 682–83. 
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more, worker centers fulfill the mission of the NLRA in a hostile environ-
ment for advocates of workers’ rights. For these reasons, we argue that the 
NLRA’s protections for associational activity should extend to worker cen-
ters, without burdening worker centers with its cumbersome stick of report-
ing and associational restrictions. 
A. Worker Centers Organize the Marginalized 
Labor law’s concept of “dealing with” should not be interpreted broadly 
to include worker centers because they organize some of the most marginal-
ized employees in the U.S. economy. Worker centers do not serve as a sub-
stitute for collective bargaining and the long-term contractual benefits that 
can result. They do important work, however, to improve conditions for 
some of the most disadvantaged populations of workers in the United States. 
They often organize employees whose basic rights to minimum wage, over-
time premiums, and workplace safety are routinely violated. 
In his study of black worker centers, Steven Pitts notes that even 
though a significant number of black workers have jobs, “the quality of those 
jobs is poor.”92 Indeed, black workers still face a multiple decades-long em-
ployment crisis, marked by poor job quality and disproportionate unemploy-
ment (when compared to white workers).93 The National Black Worker 
Center Project, and its worker center affiliates, addresses these inequities 
through organizing, policy campaigns, and other efforts to bring the voices 
and experiences of Black workers into the solutions to the Black job crisis. 
Worker centers also participate in wide-scale efforts to address chal-
lenges faced by low-wage immigrant worker communities. Immigrant 
worker centers often engage with immigrants who work in low-paying, iso-
lated, and small workplaces that are challenging for labor unions to reach 
and organize. Sometimes they organize workers who have particularly preca-
rious situations because they are employees under labor law, but unautho-
rized individuals under immigration law.94 
In short, worker centers tend to represent precarious and low-wage 
populations with few resources.95 Thus, the imposition of labor law restric-
tions on their public protest tools and the addition of compliance costs 
would be particularly harmful given the thin-resourcing of many worker cen-
92 Steven Pitts, The National Black Worker Center Project: Grappling with the Power-Build-
ing Imperative, in NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND MOVE-
MENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE 115, 115 (2018).
93 See id. at 118–26. 
94 See Xochitl Bada et al., Union Organizing, Advocacy, and Services at the Nexus of Immi-
grant and Labor Rights, in NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND 
MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE 91, 91–93 (2018).
95 Crain & Matheny, supra note 1, at 562–65 (2014) (“Some of these mobilization efforts 
mirror pre-NLRA worker organizing, crossing workplace, industry, and geographical bounda-
ries, and connecting economic issues with political and social justice.”); Rosenfeld, supra note 
15, at 472–73. 
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ters. This outcome would conflict with a central purpose of the NLRA to 
offset inequality of bargaining power. 
B. Inequality Parallels New Deal Levels 
Another policy rationale for our approach is that worker centers combat 
inequality which parallels New Deal era levels. Income inequality, which we 
might conceive of as the underlying structure of bargaining inequality, is on 
the rise. The top ten percent, those families whose incomes were higher than 
90 percent of American families, have captured a growing share of income 
since the 1970s.96 Their share expanded from around 33 percent in the early 
1970s, to 50.1 percent in 2017, only slightly less than its peak of 50.6 per-
cent in 2012.97 In the past quarter century (since 1993), the incomes of the 
vast majority of Americans, those with incomes in the bottom 99 percent, 
grew by 15.5 percent.98Meanwhile, the incomes of the top 1 percent cat-
apulted by 95.5 percent, capturing just over half (51 percent) of the overall 
economic growth of real incomes during this period.99 
Worker centers operate in a context of income inequality that is compa-
rable to that which New Deal advocates and legislators faced in the 1930s.100 
In 2007, just before the 2008 economic crash, the top 1 percent’s share of 
income soared to its recent nadir of 23.5 percent, nearly returning to its 1928 
peak of 24 percent.101 Furthermore, the top ten percent’s share of income 
now exceeds its prior height of 48 percent in 1928, just before the stock 
market crash of 1929.102 
Unions, the organizations conceived of as the bulwark against inequal-
ity of bargaining power, have withered. The percent of employed workers 
who are members of a union has decreased from its peak of 33.4 percent in 
1945 to 24.1 percent in 1979 and to 10.4 percent by 2017.103 Private sector 
96 Thomas Piketty & Emanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2 (2003).
97 Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United 
States (Updated with 2017 Final Estimates) 1, 4–5 (Mar. 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4BE-
CRAG].
98 Id. at 5. 
99 Id. The top one percent of earning families, those with incomes above $460,000 in 
2017, increased their share of income from around 9 percent in the 1970s to around 20 percent 
since the early 1990s. The top one percent enjoyed 22 percent of income in 2017, down just 
slightly from its peak in 2007 of 23.5 percent. Id. at 1, 5. 
100 See Andrias, supra note 1, at 2, 5 (“Economic inequality is at its highest point since the 
Gilded Age, when unionization rates were similarly low.”). For a discussion of the relative 
power of business in the lead up to, and during, the New Deal period, see Leslie C. Gates, 
Theorizing Business Power in the Semi-Periphery: Mexico 1970-2000, 38 THEORY & SOC’Y 57, 
62–64 (2009).
101 Saez, supra note 97, at 5. 
102 Id. at 4–5. 
103 Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database 
from the Current Population Survey, 56 INDUS. & LAB. RELATIONS REV. 349 (2003) (updated 
annually at unionstats.com [https://perma.cc/36CD-QSLF]). 
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unionization rates have shrunk even more precipitously, from 24.2 percent in 
1973 to just 6 percent of private sector workers since 2010.104 
Leaving aside fierce debates about whether union decline is a cause or 
consequence of income inequality, the coincidence of low unionization rates 
and high income-inequality makes our present era strikingly similar to the 
early 1930s. New Deal architects considered inequality and its resultant ills 
in the workplace to have reached intolerably high levels. Figure 2 illustrates 
how unionization rates have sunk to their early 1930s level, even as the share 
of income consumed by the top ten percent has increased. 
FIGURE 2: UNION MEMBERSHIP AND SHARE OF INCOME GOING TO 
THE TOP 10 PERCENT 
 
Source: Union membership data from U.S. Census Bureau accessed at http://www.unionstats.com/; Top 10 
percent share of income from Piketty and Saez data updated as of 2017, and first published in 2007. 
As inequality reaches historic levels and unions’ organizational strength 
wanes, worker centers play a critical role in addressing inequality of bargain-
ing power. 
C. Hostile Environment for Workers’ Rights 
Worker centers not only confront a historical return to heightened ine-
quality in bargaining power, they do so at a time of increasing hostility to-
wards workers and their advocates. This serves as the final policy rationale 
underlying our approach. Some courts, employers, conservative groups, and 
local governments have become more hostile towards labor unions.105 Strik-
104 Jeffrey M. Hirsh & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1729 n. 6, 1730 (2018); Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 103, at 
349. 
105 Andrias, supra note 1, at 6 (describing reasons for labor’s decline as delay, weak penal-
ties, under-enforcement, unresponsive to supply chain in global economy and lack of support 
for industry wide bargaining); Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elec-
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ing, organizing, and bargaining has become incredibly difficult for unions.106 
Labor scholars elaborate how courts and the NLRB have enhanced the 
NLRA’s stick (restrictions on union activity)107 and have reduced labor law’s 
carrot (protections of employee collective activity).108 This is what Karl Klare 
famously called the “judicial deradicalization” of 1935 labor law (the 
NLRA), which in the eyes of many scholars was the “most radical piece of 
legislation [Congress] ever enacted.”109 
Worker centers are, thus, often “scrambling” to find whatever “leverage” 
they can muster “within an increasingly hostile economic, political and legal 
environment.”110 Even if worker centers do not take advantage of the carrot, 
labor law’s stick should not get in the way of worker centers’ efforts on behalf 
of vulnerable groups of low-wage workers at a time of such acute inequality 
of bargaining power. 
V. WORKER CENTERS AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR POLICY 
Worker centers cannot overcome the heightened inequality of bargain-
ing power rooted in labor’s waning organizational power and the nation’s 
rising income inequality. As a new experimental model, however, worker 
centers provide a glimmer of hope in an otherwise bleak environment for 
workers’ rights advancement. Worker centers, along with labor unions and 
other worker advocates, can and should experiment with “improvisational” 
organizing efforts that can shift the practices of twenty-first century 
companies.111 
In this context, our carrot-but-not-a-stick approach opens up space for 
emerging worker centers to expand their efforts to improve the working lives 
of the growing low-wage workforce. It provides an additional tool in worker 
centers’ toolkit that has the potential to protect their constituents when they 
face employer retaliation. 
tions and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE 
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 75 (2001) (documenting hostility).
106 The public sector is not immune. In its most recent public sector labor law decision, 
Janus v. AFSCME, the U.S. Supreme Court struck a blow to labor law in the public sector. 138 
S.Ct. 2448 (2018). It made it harder for public sector unions to collect payment from employ-
ees who benefit from a contract the union negotiated and administers on their behalves. Id. 
107 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527, 1532 (2002).
108 Crain & Matheny, supra note 1; see also Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 
TEX. L. REV. 1591, 1611 (2016) (describing court rulings curtailing labor law protection); 
Estlund, supra note 8, at 177 (“As a policy matter, I join the legions of labor law scholars who 
contend that the “delicate balance” struck by Congress is far out of whack and sharply tilted 
against workers’ ability to claim union representation and the benefits of collective 
bargaining.”).
109 Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 63 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1977).
110 Janice Fine, et al., Introduction to NO ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, 
POLICY AND MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE 1 (2018). 
111 Michael Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 597, 669 (2016) (con-
cluding that new efforts will be impactful if they can get companies to the negotiating table). 
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As such, our approach proposes one way that labor law remains relevant 
without legislative reform. While legislative change is appealing,112 the pros-
pects for labor law reform, which improves upon existing New Deal legisla-
tion and policy directives, seems exceedingly dim.113 Even if legislative 
reform were possible, it would be hard to replicate the New Deal economic 
and social conditions that gave rise to labor law protections for employee 
organizing. It would be difficult to match, let along improve upon, the ex-
isting language of the NLRA. 
Corporations have gained enormous power in American politics and 
the economy since the 1970s.114 In the 1970s, for instance, the business com-
munity mobilized to defeat a number of efforts to regulate the workplace, 
including a Labor Law Reform Bill. They successfully championed bills that 
favored business and increased income inequality, such as the Economic Re-
covery Tax Act.115 Since then, corporations, especially transnational corpora-
tions, have further tightened their hold on power by successfully elevating 
the locus of key policy-making to international agencies and quasi-judicial 
bodies far removed even from the US legislative process.116 
As we consider how to reinvigorate labor policy we must keep these 
realities in mind. As Professor Lance Compa compellingly put it, we “must 
be careful” and not “so frustrated with problems and so enamored of novelty 
that we undermine hard-won foundations in our labor law system.”117 In this 
spirit, we should take care to preserve (and ideally, to revive) the lofty New 
Deal goal of addressing inequality of bargaining power in the workplace. 
112 See Kate Andrias, supra note 1, at 8 (proposing “a new labor law” that would draw from 
European models to combine “bargaining that occurs in the public arena on a sectoral and 
regional basis-with both old and new forms of worksite representation.”). 
113 See Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: “The New Labor Law” Must Still 
Grapple With the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-Sustainable 
Worker Organizations, 126 YALE L. J. F. 488, 489 (2017) (challenging the notion that advo-
cates should take eye off of “employer-employee dyad,” highlighting the urgency of “self-fi-
nancing of worker organizations,” and contending that mandatory sectoral bargaining is not 
viable). 
114 Michael Dreiling & Derek Darves, Corporate Unity in American Trade Policy: A Net-
work Analysis of Corporate-Dyad Political Action, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1514, 1514 (2011); Kevin A. 
Young et al., Capital Strikes as a Corporate Political Strategy: The Structural Power of Business in 
the Obama Era, 46 POL. & SOC’Y 3, 28 (2018); see generally Harland Prechel, Corporate Power 
and US Economic and Environmental Policy, 1978-2008, 5 CAM. J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y, 
357 (2012); WILLIAM DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? THE TRIUMPH OF THE CORPO-
RATE RICH vi (2014). 
115 Patrick Akard, Corporate Mobilization and Political Power: The Transformation of U.S. 
Economic Policy in the 1970s, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 597 (1992). 
116 Nitsan Chorev, REMAKING U.S. TRADE  POLICY: FROM  PROTECTIONISM TO 
GLOBALIZATION 10 (2007); see generally AMY QUARK, GLOBAL RIVALRIES (2013). 
117 Lance Compa, Not Dead Yet: Preserving Labor Law Strengths While Exploring New 
Labor Law Strategies, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609, 612 (2014); see also id. (“Scrapping the 
NLRA and sanctions-based employment laws for untested alternatives could put workers and 
unions in a deeper hole. Instead of giant leaps in reforming labor and employment laws, we 
have the hard, unromantic job of making small steps forward.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
American labor law provides basic rights to “employees,” not labor or-
ganizations. So, as long as worker centers are organizing individuals who fit 
the NLRA definition of employee, labor law’s protections against employer 
retaliation (its carrot) applies. While it is not a cure-all for extreme income 
inequality and formidable challenges to worker organizing efforts, our pro-
posed carrot-but-not-a-stick approach is a step toward supporting the 
broad-based associational experimentation needed to forge a more equal and 
just society in the future. 
We advanced a number of rationales for why worker centers are not 
labor organizations subject to labor law’s restrictions on some organizing ac-
tivity and heightened government reporting requirements (its stick). We 
drew from our original research on the filing and funding profiles of more 
than a 100 worker centers to argue that worker centers are not set up to 
engage in ongoing interactions with employers over time. They do not have 
the intent, or organizational capacity, to deal with employers in the labor law 
sense. 
We made doctrinal arguments under Constitutional and labor law to 
support a narrower reading of “labor organization” in the worker center con-
text. First Amendment principles implore us to apply labor law’s stick only 
to groups that have the extraordinary privilege of exclusivity and collective 
bargaining protections. Moreover, the underlying inequality of bargaining 
power rationale of U.S. labor law directs us to exclude worker centers, and 
their nascent organizing efforts, from the reach of labor law’s stick. 
There are compelling policy reasons supporting our approach. Ameri-
can labor policy’s destiny is connected to how it treats innovative nontradi-
tional organizing efforts. Worker centers are voluntary associations that 
offset the very inequality of bargaining power labor policy intends to ad-
dress—an inequality that, like the New Deal period, is at historic levels. 
These centers provide an alternative approach to worker organizing, outside 
of the traditional labor union context, which is essential at a time of extreme 
hostility against unions and workers’ rights. Thus, worker center constituents 
can and should enjoy the carrot of labor law protections, but worker centers 
as organizations should not suffer the stick assigned to labor organizations. 
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